suggests that there is no moral difference between the near-extinction of the buffalo by white hunters and the killing of feral animals in areas slated for restoration to natural conditions. (Shelton, p. 9) According to Shelton, the buffalo were killed off because they did not fit with the kind of civilization brought to the American West by European settlers, and likewise, feral animals do not fit with a particular view of nature that has emerged since the 19 th Century in North America to guide environmental restoration.
While the focus of Shelton's article is on restoration efforts carried out by the Nature Conservancy and the National Park Service on Santa Cruz Island off the coast of California, her concerns raise questions about the moral costs of restoration generally.
As a practical matter, projects to restore degraded landscapes must confront the question of what to do with the non-native plants and animals that have colonized the area to be restored. "Restoration requires the disruption of an existing ecosystem which is deemed to be 'unnatural.'" (Shelton, p.10) Even in areas where no restoration is contemplated, there is increasing concern about invasive species that disrupt food chains, extirpate species, and perhaps curtail ecological services. Shelton's focus on feral animals is a special case of this more general practical problem.
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Morally speaking, the permissibility of eradicating non-native species depends on what we mean by restoration, what the goals of restoration are, and whether these goals are morally justified. In this essay, I shall investigate this conflict between the restoration of nature and the status of non-native animals that are caught up in the process. The apparent conflict between the goals of restoration and the lives of feral animals is not just a practical problem that practitioners of restoration must resolve. This issue also requires, ultimately, that we reflect more carefully about our sense of the place of human beings in nature.
The case for eradication of non-natives
There are several reasons why one might defend the practice of eradicating nonnative species from a place one wishes to restore. For conservation biologists, one of the key reasons, presumably, is that the non-native species out-compete native species and prevent them from occupying niches that they formerly inhabited. If these displaced species are also threatened or endangered, then their value for conservation purposes increases. Assuming that the non-native species are not themselves in danger, it seems reasonable to intervene to protect the interests of those species who are most at risk. The first argument is, then, an argument from the value of biological diversity and the importance of sustaining species diversity. (Norton 1986 ) This is best done in natural settings rather than in seed banks or zoos.
A second argument specifically applies to domesticated or feral animals within the boundaries of the restoration area. Several philosophers take a hard line against the status of such animals. Both domesticated and feral animals are, according to Eric Katz and Baird Callicott, for example, human artifacts, not natural beings. (Callicott 1980; Palamar's solution is a revised notion of restoration she calls "restorashyn." On this view, our goal should not be to restore land to a fixed pre-existing condition, but rather to focus on a "process by which we set up conditions that open the scope of possibilities for the land. These restorative conditions will also encourage parameters allowing the land to participate actively in outcomes." (Palamar, p. 294 Setting up pre-European contact as an arbitrary restoration benchmark, Shelton claims, those carrying out the restoration blinded themselves to the specifics on the ground and to the harm their agenda inflicted.
The notion that restoration need not be guided by a fixed, historically determined plant and animal inventory opens up the possibility that feral and domesticated animals could find a place within a restoration project. But perhaps Palamar overstates the case for restorashyn. While it is essential for those engaged in restoration to have a sensitive and informed understanding of the land they propose to work with -and who would not agree with this -it is not clear where Palamar's emphasis on a non-dominating process leads. She supports eradication of invasive non-native species "because they limit the possibilities for a number of other species"(294), but this still requires human judgment and management. And while she denies giving carte blanche to introduce exotic species from just anywhere, she also supports the notion of an inclusiveness tempered by pluralism, that is, introduction of species that add to overall diversity and complexity.
Having abandoned the historical benchmark of a nature prior to human disruption, no standards for restorashyn remain other than a sort of attentiveness to compatibility and 
Varieties of Restoration
Whether or not feral and domesticated animals should be permitted to remain in a restored landscape depends on the goals of restoration. Unfortunately, it is not clear that discussions of restoration always operate with the same concept. At times, the emphasis is on whether untouched nature can be restored. At other times, the focus is on the human benefits to be derived from involving human beings in restoration activities. And some restoration projects aim simply to restore a particular set of species to the landscape, but do not aspire to restore everything that may have been altered by human activities.
For Katz, protecting feral domesticated animals would be absurd not just because one cannot restore an un-manipulated nature through manipulation, but also because the natural value he wishes to protect is a holistic value. (Katz 1994d, p. 24 ) Biotic communities or ecosystem wholes have value, but the individual members of the community have only derivative value, to the degree that they participate in maintaining the health of that community. The problem with feral animals, it might be claimed, is that they are not members of natural biotic communities at all. At best, they were once members of the mixed, domesticated human-animal community and had moral protection interventions always lead to a diminution of natural value. At the same time, it is obvious that human use of nature is inevitable and it is one of the core means whereby both nature and humanity come to be defined and understood. In order to understand whether the restoration of nature is compatible with the protection of at least some of the non-native plants and animals that colonize lands used by humans, we need a conception of nature that encompasses and accommodates the human presence.
Anne Chapman notes that nature can signify not only a world separate from all human influence, but several other things as well. (2007) When we talk of nature, for example, we often mean not something completely separate from ourselves, but rather the totality of the biological and material environment, an environment that includes human beings as biological organisms. Some of our concern with the abuse of nature derives from this understanding of human dependence on and embeddedness in the natural environment, because harms done to nature often cause damage to the human organism as well. Secondly, nature often refers to the material resources used by a particular human culture. Degradation of nature in this sense is a threat to the resource base out of which humans build their human, domesticated world. Defined in this way, it is not nature per se that is degraded by human activity; rather, particular stocks of material resources, parts of nature, can be used unwisely. Protecting nature in this sense of the term may simply mean using nature sustainably to satisfy the long-term needs of human beings.
Finally, nature has meanings that are internal to the cultural life of a particular human community. The point here is that we should acknowledge that how we define nature is a matter of cultural choice. The concept plays a certain role in arguments, theories, and struggles internal to particular communities at particular historical moments.
Its meaning is contextual; it changes over time, and different meanings serve different (1) Nature 1 : Preserving naturalness may mean keeping people and their works out altogether, letting nature follow its own independent course. This dualistic conception of the nature/human relationship excludes any possibility of restoring nature. In particular, the very presence of feral animals is already a sign that human history has intruded upon nature's own history. In such an environment, nature has already been lost, replaced by some form of humanized, artifactual landscape.
(2) Nature 2 : Restoration of nature may, however, simply mean restoring ecological functioning, natural succession, biodiversity, species inventories, ecological niches, the integrity of biotic communities, and the health of biological and ecological systems.
Understanding nature as the totality of the biotic and abiotic environment, human participation may undermine ecological health or restore it. And it may do this in whole, or only in part.
(3) Nature 3 : We may restore nature in the sense of natural productivity, resource sustainability and renewal. Meaning by nature simply the material resources that human communities must draw upon to sustain their cultural lives, restoration of nature would be compatible with intelligent and responsible human stewardship.
(4) Nature 4 : We may restore a degraded system to what it would have been, had it not been degraded by human activities. Drawing upon untouched nature as a standard, informed human actors may actively intervene in a system to reintroduce the qualities and entities that are missing from the benchmark. The result would be a managed nature, but to the extent that it faithfully meets the appropriate standard, it would nonetheless be natural. These five different senses of restoration make possible a somewhat more nuanced exploration of the compatibility of feral animals and the restoration of nature.
To start with, it is worth noting that only the first sense of restoration, Nature 1 , carries with it any sense of paradox or contradiction and only Nature 1 presupposes the exclusive dualism between human and nature. The other four senses, therefore, leave open the possibility that feral animals and domesticated plants and animals might be compatible with the restoration of nature.
How in fact do feral animals fare here? As I've suggested, the answer depends on what our intention is when we try to restore nature. Shelton implies that leaving feral animals in place can be compatible with Nature 2 , since their presence may not in fact compromise the integrity of the biotic community or compromise biological diversity. In this, she would seem to be in agreement with Palamar, whose main concern is to promote the healthy functioning of the land: Nature 2 . From this point of view, whether or not Understanding that restoration of nature may legitimately have a number of different meanings, and seeing the conceptual difficulties with restoration of the dualistic Nature 1 , it seems morally appropriate to accord considerability, and perhaps even protection to feral animals -something that Shelton claims is not extended to them in restoration projects -despite their origins in human domestication. At the same time, we cannot ignore the relevance of holistic ecological concerns that must constrain the situational significance of feral animals in particular circumstances.
Reductionism and Human/Nature Dualism
The problematic status of feral animals raises interesting questions about common dichotomies between wild and domesticated landscapes, between the natural and the humanized. These distinctions are significant not just because they matter to our practical decisions about land use, but because they matter to our self-understanding and our place in the world. Banning feral animals from a site of nature restoration seems selfevident only to the extent that we define nature dualistically to exclude the human presence and define restoration as a paradoxical human effort to erase the human presence from the site by returning it to a pre-human condition.
There are, however, several layers of human presence on the land that make this project an impossible one. On the one hand, we can never fully escape Nature 5 . We must acknowledge the ways in which our vision of nature at any given time emerges from a cultural interpretation of a particular community's experience of the world. The distinction between the natural and the human/cultural is so problematic that some philosophers want to erase one or other side of the distinction altogether. It is not uncommon to hear the notion that the human/nature distinction should be ignored because everything is part of nature. Humans are naturally evolved beings and the intelligence with which we manipulate our environments is also a natural product. Our artifacts, though designed with human purposes in mind, are nonetheless made of natural materials. Without an understanding of those natural materials and their causal properties, creation of artifacts would be impossible. Palamar voices a version of this idea when she attacks restoration based on historical benchmarks on the grounds that Reducing the human/nature dualism entirely to the side of nature ignores several issues of importance. On the one hand, it ignores the legitimate conceptual distinction that we make in everyday speech between elements of our surrounding that are the products of human culture and those that exist independent of that culture. (Keeling 2008) The music of Mozart, for example, is indeed a matter of ink scratches on paper and vibrating sound waves in the air; but it is not "just" that. We are not just interested in the material mechanics, the physics, of the music, or even the biological or neurological constitution of the composer and his audience. Mozart's renown derives from the beauty and complexity of the music, its impact on the emotions, and the sophistication of its artistry. Culture, as well as nature, is required in order to make sense of Mozart's accomplishments.
Equally important, however, is the fact that if everything is nature, we lose a valuable tool for thinking about how to limit human actions. For example, Palamar objects to a rulebook approach to restoration that aims to return a landscape to the way it naturally was before human interference, claiming that non-invasive, non-native -but regional -plants and animals should be permitted in a "restorashyn." But why not exotics from further afield? Indeed, why not invasive species? If nature is always changing and there is no fixed lodestone to guide restoration, then her intolerance of invasive nonnatives seems as arbitrary as the restorationist's return to native species only. Whatever happens and whatever we do, it would be natural; so anything goes. interests. The problem for Vogel is not that nature has been compromised by human activities, but that humans compromise themselves by not taking control of the ways in which they intervene in the non-human world. The problem for him is how we humanize nature, not that we do so. Human/nature dualism is resolved here by eliminating nature;
everything is cultural, humanized.
But, as we learn more and more frequently to our cost, nature, in some sense of the word, has a way of reasserting itself through the filter or medium of human cultural perception. The narrative that we tell ourselves about how we have controlled nature and turned it entirely to our use falls apart in the face of hurricanes, tsunamis, pest infestations, emerging diseases, climate change, famine, and the disappearance of species that humans value. There is inevitably a dialectical relationship between nature as independent of human perception and nature as cultural projection that forbids complacency about our own cultural perceptions. The politically important insight that our interventions in nature may serve to dominate other human beings need not erase the ecological insight that these interventions also undermine the viability of a non-human world that both subsists within the cultural ambit and yet remains forever other as well.
Both reductionist strategies have ambiguous implications for feral animals caught up in restoration projects. If everything is natural, then feral pigs and sheep are no less natural than wild foxes or bald eagles; their different origins become irrelevant to decisions about restoring nature. On the other hand, if everything is cultural, then the wildness of the foxes is as much a cultural projection as the compromised feral-wildness of the feral animals. In either case, the concept "natural" no longer helps us to understand the question of how to restore nature. Neither side of the reduction gives any But perhaps the more appropriate conclusion is just that we need be much more careful about what sense of "natural" we mean when we appeal to the naturalness or unnaturalness of particular beings or ecological assemblages. Feral animals are certainly not natural in the dualist sense of the term, nor are the biotic communities in which they live. But they are certainly natural in the sense that they are living organisms subject to biological constraints and functioning within biological and ecological communities.
They may co-exist with nature understood as a resource base, and indeed, may provide a resource or ecological services of their own. Finally, if feral animals cause no ecological or biological disruption to the populations and functions of a restored community, then even restored communities containing feral animals might satisfy the benchmark criteria of naturalness.
Conclusion
As we have seen, sensitivity to the multiple meanings of nature and of restoration has differential implications for feral animals. The plight of feral animals lies in part in the fact that they do not fit comfortably in our current perceptual categories. They have been domesticated animals, and thus are not paradigmatic natural members of undomesticated biotic communities, yet they are not domesticated animals living within the mixed human-animal community either. Since our moral attention tends to be most engaged with those two categories, it is easier to ignore the interests of feral animals altogether. And yet, taken individually, feral animals are living beings with interests and interference for centuries, the material on which human breeders have worked has always been the material provided by natural evolution. Whether or not it is morally acceptable to inflict pain on an animal is not answered by knowing that the animal in question has been bred to serve particular human purposes. The physiology of pain remains, despite human interference.
The focus of this essay has been to argue that the significance of feral animals must be contextualized by the goals of restoration and the senses of nature involved.
Restoring to a pre-human environment, Nature 1 , is problematic for practical reasons intensive and widespread as to make such restoration practically impossible. Restoration of un-touched nature is conceptually impossible, because it requires the very hand that it seeks to exclude. In the face of these problems, it seems appropriate to seek alternative understandings of both nature and the purposes of restoration.
Nature 2 (the biotic and abiotic world), Nature 3 (the domain of resources from which human culture is constituted), and Nature 4 (the historic benchmark for evaluating species and ecosystems) provide alternative conceptions of nature within which the significance of feral species can be coherently assessed.
I have suggested that the need to remove all signs of human presence, including feral proxies, is predicated on a particular conception of nature and a particular view of what restoration is for. But this conception of nature is insufficient to guide human relationships with nature. We must be willing to respect ecological functioning, the natural resource base, and also our own cultural perceptions of the value of nature, while taking a critical stance towards them all. Responsible restoration is not so much just a matter of listening better to the land, as Palamar suggests, but of listening better to our own cultural imperatives and filters in order to subject them to more careful assessment as well. Such a process can provide no all-or-nothing protections to feral animals, but it can remove the blindfold that keeps them invisible, thereby enabling us to enter into more informed dialogue with the land that holds them.
